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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This  study  investigates  the  technical  and  institutional  factors  that  hinder  the  effective  use  of  irrigation
water  and  the  development  of  the  local  rice  value  chain  in an  inland  valley  of  Benin.  Primary  data  have
been  collected  in  three  areas:  Koussin-Lélé,  Bamè  and  Zonmon.  The  diagnosis  indicates  that  both  local
and higher  level  institutional  barriers  affect  the  development  of the  local  rice  value  chain  negatively.  The
barriers  to innovation  include  an unclear  division  of responsibilities  between  local  farmer  groups  and  the
government  for canal  maintenance,  a lack  of  effective  local  rules  for the  distribution  and  maintenance
of  the irrigation  infrastructure  and  distrust  among  farmers,  related  to  privileges  of the  farmer  leaders,  asnnovation
ice value chain
enin
well as the constraining  formal  and  informal  credit  systems  and  uncertain  market  outlets.  The  barriers
depress  rice  output  and  the  income  of  farmers.  The  windows  of  opportunity  to stimulate  innovation
comprise  consumers’  afﬁnity  to local  products  and territorial  product  labels,  private–public  community
partnerships,  the  irrigation  potential  of inland  valleys  by the use  of  small  pumps  in combination  with
shallow  tube  well  irrigation.
© 2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.
 All rights reserved.. Introduction
The economic liberalization policies and reforms undertaken in
enin since the 1990s have led to the transfer of the control of irriga-
ion infrastructure to farmer organizations [1].  Subsequent reform
f the agricultural sector aims to revitalize water management in
rder to improve water use for agricultural purposes and ultimately
armers’ livelihoods [2].  However, an exploratory study conducted
ecently in the inland valleys shows that problems related to water
anagement in rice production remain [3].  Many technological
ptions that address water management problems are waiting on
he shelf but are not widely used [4] and farmers still experience
he effects of drought and ﬂood that limit their production [3].
he non-maintenance of irrigation canals is one of the main fac-
ors causing problems at the level of the rice plots managed under
ravity irrigation [3].
For a long time, innovation has been regarded as the technical
utput of research [5], and as something to be transferred to the
sers. However, the introduction of infrastructure and new tech-
ologies is not effective if they are not appropriate for the context
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +229 97475607.
E-mail address: edmond.totin@gmail.com (E. Totin).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.06.001in which they are promoted and not adapted to users’ realities [6,7].
Empirical studies demonstrate that innovation involves a simulta-
neous re-conﬁguration of the social and technical dimensions of
use [8,9]. Participatory approaches like farming systems research
and extension emerged in response to the limitations and undesir-
able effects of linear technology transfer. Their focus on the ﬁeld
to farm level within a recommendation domain, however, has met
with less success than expected; our ﬁrst hypothesis is that this
may  be attributed to the limited room for change at the level of the
single farm, local farmer group or village.
Effective deployment and application of technology in complex
problem situations calls for a more comprehensive approach to
innovation [7,10,11]. In this perspective, institutions are seen to
play an important role. This article focuses on the institutions that
hinder innovations but that could create space for positive changes
in the use of irrigation water and farmers’ livelihoods. Our second
hypothesis is that neglect of the institutional dimensions of inno-
vation processes may  lead to a disappointing performance of any
intervention or self-organizing initiative for change [12].
In the context of this study an understanding of the relation
between practices and rules is developed in order to examine why
the problems in rice production are so persistent and why  relevant,
seemingly simple solutions are not taken up. We  consider farmers’
practices to be shaped by institutional barriers and opportunities
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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hat exist in and around the current production–consumption sys-
em. For the purpose of the study we understand institutions to
nclude formal and informal rules, implicit cultural norms, values
nd symbols and social rules embedded in relations, physical arte-
acts and infrastructure [13–15].  We  use the term ‘institutional
arriers’ to refer to constraints related to the institutions that pre-
ent promising technologies from being used [16].
The study is based on research carried out in the Agonlin Plateau
egion of Benin from July through November 2010, where farmers
eek to create a living out of rice production but hardly suc-
eed because of the many barriers. The research aimed ﬁrst to
dentify the main problems in rice production and then the institu-
ional barriers that hinder signiﬁcant improvement of the local rice
alue chain and effective water use. Thirdly, promising windows of
pportunity for innovation are identiﬁed. The article focuses on (1)
armers’ practices in the study areas, (2) the socio-technical prob-
ems in the local rice value chain; (3) the institutional barriers in
hich farmers’ practices are embedded, and (4) potential institu-
ional opportunities for innovation. The next section provides a
escription of the research design including data collection and
nalytic methods, followed by the ﬁndings on the above mentioned
our issues, analysis and discussion. The article concludes by sum-
arizing the main institutional barriers and pointing to promising
pportunities for an integrated approach to innovation.
. Methodology
.1. Area selection and properties
Three areas of the Agonlin Plateau (Koussin-Lélé, Bamè and
onmon) were selected on the basis of an exploratory study that
creened 18 rice producing villages located throughout Benin [3].
he areas were chosen because the issues around water use were
ound to be persistent and because (1) they offer contrasting
ater use practices and opportunities, (2) the farmers have a
ong experience in irrigated rice production, and (3), a number of
rojects (including the Urgent Food Security Programme (PUASA),
fricaRice, and Nerica Project) are ongoing in these areas and pro-
ided an opportunity to study how these projects deal with the
hallenges of innovation.
The irrigation schemes were constructed in 1976 with the help
f Chinese experts who introduced rice production in each of these
reas. For the ﬁrst two years, the schemes were controlled by pub-
ic authorities and the Chinese irrigation project, which provided
eeds, farm tools, rice processing and marketing facilities. After
he project leaders left in 1978 the production of rice collapsed.
he reforms taken under the liberalization process in the 1990s
ed to the revitalization of farmer associations and the government
hifted control of the irrigation infrastructure to the associations.
able 1 provides further relevant information about the context of
he three cases.
.2. Data collection and analysis methods
Data were obtained using focus group discussions [17] with rice
armers regarding (1) their practices of growing rice and managing
he water resource, (2) their problems and concerns, (3) the barri-
rs for innovation in the local rice value chain and improving the
ffectiveness of water use, and (4) potential solutions. The focus
roups were organized per area and included rice farmer associ-
tions registered with the regional authority. No more than eight
embers were invited for each group discussion, to aid effective
acilitation. We  conducted 12 focus group discussions with 65 of
he 200 farmers at Koussin-Lélé, three focus group discussions at
amè with 14 out of the 19 farmers, and 2 focus group discussionsof Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 57– 66
at Zonmon with 16 out of the 21 farmers. In total, 95 rice farmers
including 72 males and 23 females were involved in the focus group
discussions.
During the focus group discussions the farmers were invited
to present and analyse the problems they face with the aid of a
visual instrument, the socio-technical root-system [18], in order
to structure the inter-relations between the technical and social
problems elicited. The discussions were organized to let the farmers
reﬂect together and to provide an opportunity to the researcher to
observe the interaction among the rice farmers [19].
However, we  noted that the tool induced some bias as individual
farmers appeared to base their own responses and arguments on
what was  said by others.
The general problem tree presented in this article was developed
by building on the problem trees developed by the participants in
the group discussions. In addition, a questionnaire sample survey
was used to gather quantitative data on production costs, plot size,
rice output, rice prices in the local markets and production cycles
over the year, in order to validate the income problems mentioned.
The survey covered a total of 60 randomly sampled rice farmers:
35 at Koussin-Lélé, 15 at Bamè and 10 at Zonmon.
Participant observation [20] of informal meetings among farm-
ers gave us the opportunity to triangulate the information from
the focus group discussions about their daily practices, especially
on farmers’ illegal water management practices. At the end of the
ﬁeld work, a meeting with the farmers from all three areas was
organized to reﬂect on our ﬁndings concerning the main problems
identiﬁed during the study and to explore their responses to the
innovation opportunities identiﬁed. Table 2 provides an overview
of the research design.
The main institutional barriers to improvement of the situation
were identiﬁed from analysis of the ﬁndings, using the innovation
system (IS) framework [21]. The IS consists of a matrix of system
elements: barriers that may  block learning and innovation (dis-
played in the rows), and the actors who  reproduce the barriers
(displayed in the columns). Our design classiﬁed the following four
barriers:
1. Infrastructural barriers, relating to the knowledge infrastruc-
ture made up by departments of Research and Development,
universities, research centres and all related regulations, and
the physical infrastructure, consisting principally of roads and
telecommunications.
2. Hard institutional barriers, relating to formal rules and regula-
tions, and soft institutional barriers relating to symbols, values
and norms.
3. Network barriers, calibrated by strength of connectivity, whereby
strong interactions cause blindness towards new ideas from out-
side and weak interaction hinder actors to combine their forces
to work for change.
4. Market structures,  relating to the position of and relations
between market parties along the value chain.
Originally, the IS framework was developed and applied to a
national system of innovations in order to analyse systematically
the barriers that block the development, use and diffusion of new
products and technologies. It has also been used in adapted form
to analyse institutional barriers relating to persistent problems of
sustainable development [21].
The analysis of institutional barriers in this article builds upon
the problem tree identiﬁed in the focus groups, supplemented by
a literature study of the historical roots of these problems (such as
the constitution and regulation of the rice market in Benin).
The analysis of the opportunities for innovation in the current
setting took a slightly different route, starting with meetings with
farmers in each of the research areas at which potential solutions
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Table 1
Description of the three study areas.
Koussin-Lélé Bamè Zonmon
Irrigation scheme area 200 ha – originally 120 ha were
irrigated by the Chinese sponsors
33 ha in the inland valleys.
4.5 ha are currently used to
produce rice; farmers also
use 10 ha of upland
88 ha originally irrigated
but less than 10 ha are used
now for rice cultivation
Irrigation technique Gravity system Gravity system in the
valley and pump irrigation
on the upland
Gravity system
Farmer groups 11 farmer associations (200
members)
3 farmer groups (19
members)
3 farmer groups (21
members)
Experience in rice production Since 1976, farmers have produced
rice but production decreased
between 1980 and 1984
Rice production resumed in 2008 after collapsing in 1978 when the
Chinese left the region
Source: ﬁeld data; FGDs.
Table 2
Description of the research design.
Data collection methods Number of farmers
involved
Area Focus
Focus group discussions 65
14
16
Koussin-Lélé
Bamè
Zonmon
(1) Farmers’ practices
(2) Farmers’ problems and concerns
(3) Barriers for innovation in the local rice value chain
and improving the effectiveness of water use
(4) Potential opportunities for innovation
Questionnaire survey
35 Koussin-Lélé (1) Rice production cost
15  Bamè (2) Farmers’ returns from rice production
10 Zonmon (3) Production area
Participant observation All 3 areas Daily situation and practices of rice farmers during
growing season
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o the barriers were explored. Subsequently the researchers held
eetings with a number of organizations that are involved in the
ice sector, including the regional extension ofﬁce and the national
ommittee of the rice farmer association (Comité de Concertation des
iziculteurs du Bénin – CCR-B), in order to further explore the oppor-
unities for innovation identiﬁed by the local level actors. Finally,
he identiﬁed opportunities were discussed during the ﬁnal meet-
ng, attended by a total of 34 rice farmers, from the three study
reas, the researchers, the extension ofﬁcers who operate in these
reas and two representatives from the PUASA project.
. Major results: problems and barriers to innovation
.1. Farmers’ practices
The practices of the rice farmers in the three areas are summa-
ized in Table 3. We  concentrate on those practices that relate to
he ﬁve main problem categories identiﬁed in the focus group dis-
ussions: (1) water access and distribution, (2) maintenance of the
rrigation infrastructure, (3) rice production cycles, (4) selling, and
5) agricultural ﬁnancing.
.1.1. Water access and distribution
In the ﬁrst production season (September–December) all rice
armers in Koussin-Lélé can take as much irrigation water from
he Koussingo-Lélégo streams they need. However, in the dry sea-
on from January to March the water discharge decreases and
ater becomes scarce, irrigating only 63% of all the plots (about
7 ha) sufﬁciently. In addition, the irrigation canals are sometimes
hoked with plants, decreasing the discharge capacity of the canals
nd the velocity of water ﬂow. In order to cope with the dry sea-
on shortage, the farmers have established a calendar that deﬁnesValidation of the identiﬁed opportunities for
innovation
at which time and for how long each group can get water to
their plots, by opening and closing gates in the secondary canals.
However, some farmers bypass this regulation by fraudulently
opening the gates that control the water ﬂow (mainly at night).
Some also make holes in the primary canal banks and attribute
the damage to crabs (which indeed frequently break canal banks as
well). Generally, the transgressors manage to bypass the regulation
for water distribution without being punished.
In Bamè, 19 farmers produce rice all the year in the inland val-
ley on 4.5 ha under gravity irrigation and on 10 ha in the upland
area using pump irrigation. For gravity irrigation the farmers use
and share the water from the Ahoho and Agluiglui streams that
run through the valley. Each of the 10 farmers that produce on
the uplands uses his own (mobile) motorpump for irrigation. They
do not have to share water and are independent in their prac-
tices. The focus group discussions revealed that during the dry
season 12 of the rice growers concentrate their activities in the
valley because pumping water for the upland plots means addi-
tional production cost of fuel. The farmers have not established
rules for water sharing during the dry season although the water
level decreases and becomes insufﬁcient for irrigation. Many farm-
ers manage by delaying their rice cultivation and, because of this
delay, not all farmers need water for irrigation at exactly the same
time.
In Zonmon, 21 rice farmers use an area of 5 ha under gravity
irrigation. The production site is irrigated by the Somètè stream
and the water that ﬂows from Bamè (via the Agluiglui and Ahoho
streams). There is free water distribution among farmers; at any
time a farmer who wants to irrigate his plots just opens the gate.
However, from January to February the water level in the Somètè
stream is often lower than the level at the intake from the canal.
In this critical period the farmers use a small rented motorpump to
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Table 3
Farmers’ practices in the three study areas.
Koussin-Lélé Bamè Zonmon
Water access and
distribution
Fraudulent practices to bypass
water distribution turn: opening
the water gates and making holes
in the primary canal banks
Open access to irrigation water
in the command area
Individual pumping devices
used in the upland
Open access to irrigation water
in the command area
Maintenance of the
irrigation infrastructure
Collective maintenance of principal
canals (1–3 times per year)
Collective maintenance of
canals only when silted up
(valley)
Individual maintenance of
canals and pipes (upland area)
Irregular collective
maintenance of canals
Rice  production cycles 3 growing seasons per year Continuous production (two
seasons in the inland valley and
one in the upland area). Per
year three harvests on average
1 growing season per year
Selling  Individual sales to local traders, and collectively to Dadjè (from Bohicon)
and  to PUASA (mainly as seed)
Collective sales to local traders
Rice  ﬁnancing Caution solidaire system (from local banks against a reasonable interest
rate of 24%) and credit from rice traders, money-lenders and tontine
Credit from local rice traders
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(against high interest rates (up to 150%)
ource: FDGs; participant observation.
et water from the main canal. As the use of a motorpump incurs
dditional costs of fuel and maintenance, the farmers have started
o produce earlier, following the retreat of the water level after the
ooding (which occurs each year from July to September), in order
o harvest before the dry season.
.1.2. Maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure
Canal maintenance in the inland valley is critical because it
irectly affects water supply in the dry season. Two  practices are
f importance for efﬁcient water use: the cleaning of the primary
nd secondary canals, and the restoration of the canal lining and
he gates that allow the distribution of water to the higher ﬁelds in
he valley. At Koussin-Lélé the primary canals are cleaned by the
armers collectively, on their own initiative, at the beginning of the
rst growing season (in September). The maintenance of primary
anals is mandatory for the members of the farmer organization.
ccording to current rules, farmers who do not participate in clean-
ng the canals are supposed to be punished and are not allowed to
ultivate the plots in the command area for two to three seasons.
owever, this punishment is not fully implemented in practice.
owerful farmers such as landowners and traditional chiefs or the
amily heads (known as Dah) are not punished at all or receive
ust a symbolic sanction if they do not participate. Each farmer
s responsible for cleaning the secondary irrigation and drainage
anals that adjoin his plots, one or two times a year. Some farm-
rs who share the same secondary canal organize themselves to
o this collectively. Others prefer to clean their secondary canals
ndividually. About 1 out of 10 farmers, mainly the landowners,
ome farmer leaders and family heads do not participate in this
leaning activity at all and leave the task to their neighbours. The
eighbours, although frustrated by this behaviour, perform the task
f cleaning also their neighbours’ secondary canals and drainage
anals, because it directly affects water delivery to their own  plots.
otwithstanding the cleaning activity, most of the canals are ﬁlled
ith sediment although it is widely acknowledged by the farmers
hat clean canals would allow the water to reach the higher plots
nder the gravity system in the dry season.
At Bamè and Zonmon, in the inland valley area, the farmers
sually dredge the principal canal together once a year if it has
ecome too sandy. However, in Zonmon not all farmers are moti-
ated to clean the canals and often canal maintenance is not well
erformed. In Bamè, the group members whose plots are located
long the canal are responsible for cleaning a number of segments
3 m long), but they do not always carry this out.Fig. 1. Rainfall (2009) and the production seasons in Koussin-Lélé.
Source:  http://www.tutiempo.net/en/Climate/Bohicon/01-2010/653380.htm.
In the upland area at Bamè, where farmers use small individual
pumps for irrigation, farmers’ access to water is not so depen-
dent on the gravity system. Each farmer organizes as he chooses
the maintenance of the irrigation infrastructure including the
restoration of the piping, the maintenance of the irrigation canals
and the individual pumps.
When minor restoration is needed (e.g., ﬁxing the broken irri-
gation gates in the canals) the farmer leaders in Koussin-Lélé and
Bamè ask a service provider to carry out the repairs and collect fees
to cover the cost. The fees are collected from each rice farmer, after
each harvest, and are mainly used for the purchase and mainte-
nance of collectively used machinery like cultivators and processing
equipment, as well as for the occasional repairs to the irrigation
infrastructure. In addition, in 2009 at Koussin-Lélé and Zonmon,
the PUASA programme restored some of the irrigation gates and
lined some of the primary canals that were broken, and at Zonmon
and Bamè, the Chinese experts provided large collectively operated
pumps to irrigate the rice plots located in the upland area (55 ha
at Zonmon and 18 ha at Bamè). However, the pumps that broke
down were not repaired and have remained unused ever since, even
though they are necessary for irrigating the higher areas.
3.1.3. Rice production cycles
Fig. 1 presents the growing seasons at Koussin-Lélé in relation
to the rainfall. Until 2004, most farmers in this area produced rice
only once a year, during the ﬁrst growing season. Currently, 56%
of the farmers grow rice in all three seasons; 32% produce rice in
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he ﬁrst and the second season (October and March) on the irri-
ated area and hire the land that surrounds the command area
n the third growing season. It is worth noting that during the
oods that frequently occur from July to September the farmers at
oussin-Lélé and Zonmon are not able to produce in the irrigated
reas at all because all the ﬁelds are inundated. In Zonmon, the
armers produce rice only once a year, from September to January.
n Bamè almost three quarters of the inland area is ﬂooded but all
he 19 rice farmers grow rice all year round because they use both
he valley and the upland and harvest almost three times per year.
In all three areas, farmers use a mix  of rice varieties includ-
ng Beris 21, Tox long, Tox 447, IITA 314, and Nerica. The farmers
xchange seeds. From 2008 onwards the perfumed IR-841 variety
as become widely produced at Koussin-Lélé because of its aroma.
he rice yield in the three areas varies between 3000 kg ha−1 and
000 kg ha−1, depending on the amount of fertilizer applied, the
ariety used and the potential of the land. Koussin-Lélé was the
argest production area and in 2010 farmers harvested 357 metric
ons of paddy. In the same year at Bamè, they harvested 21 metric
ons of paddy, and 12 metric tons at Zonmon. One metric ton of
addy is equivalent to about 0.7 metric ton of processed rice.
.1.4. Selling
At Koussin-Lélé and Bamè the farmers sell two kinds of product:
addy rice and milled rice. The paddy outlet is not an important
arket for the farmers. About 8 out of 10 farmers sell the milled
ice collectively to local traders (Dadjè, located at Bohicon) and the
est sell it individually to local traders from Covè and Zangnanado.
he Dadjè buy in bulk and they pay spot cash, but the other local
raders usually buy only a small quantity at a time from farmers (a
aximum of 200 kg per trader) and they delay the payment. The
ocal traders pack the rice in containers used for imported rice in
rder to sell the local rice as an imported product. At Zonmon, the
armers – apart from a few – sell their milled rice directly to local
onsumers because their production is too low to sell it to the Dadjè.
In addition, from 2008 the Urgent Food Security Programme
PUASA) has begun buying almost 10% to 15% of the rice harvest
rom farmers in Koussin-Lélé and Bamè. The programme inter-
enes in the market in order to boost rice output for the purpose of
chieving food security, re-distributing the purchased rice as seed
o farmers in areas where rice production is being newly promoted.
.1.5. Agricultural ﬁnancing
At the beginning of the ﬁrst growing season about 7 out of 10
ice farmers (those with less than three harvests per year) need
o access additional ﬁnance in order to purchase fertilizers and to
ay labourers. At Koussin-Lélé and Bamè in the upland area, where
armers cultivate a large area of land, almost three quarters of them
ire labourers from Zakpota and Ouinhi regions to carry out var-
ous production activities (ﬁeld cleaning, ploughing, sowing, etc.).
he growing season (September–October) is crucial because it coin-
ides with the beginning of the school year when parents need cash
o pay the school fees and to buy school materials for their children.
Almost 40% of all the rice farmers obtain credit at an interest rate
f 24% per year from two local rural banks, CLCAM and CAVECA, that
nance only rice production and no other food crops. These banks
rovide credit for groups of up to 11 members who  are controlled
y the farmer leaders, using a form of social guarantee known as the
aution solidaire in which all the group members are held responsi-
le for re-payment. This solidarity system does not require farmers
o provide any proof of ability to re-pay or collatoral before obtain-
ng credit.Rice farmers who get too little or no rice production credit under
he solidarity system (almost 55% of all farmers), or for other food
roduction and social needs (like a wedding, funeral or school
ees for children) tend to turn to local lenders for money, on anof Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 57– 66 61
individual basis. In fact, the lenders are the large traders and rich
workers resident in these areas who lend money to farmers for a
short period of time and in case of emergency, against high annual
interest rates of up to 150%. There are various ways for farmers to
obtain such an individual credit. Three quarters of the rice farmers
establish direct relations with speciﬁc local traders. They obtain
the credit during the growing season and they pay back in kind
from their rice harvest. In 2010, in Koussin-Lélé, for instance, farm-
ers received 6000 FCFA (1D  = 655 FCFA) during the second weeding
period (almost two months before the harvest) and they repaid the
traders one bag of 50 kg of processed rice at the end of the season,
which had a value of at least 12,500 FCFA. At Bamè, 8 of the 19 rice
farmers asked for credit from a tontine (a revolving savings and
credit group); the re-payment conditions are similar to the traders’
credit.
3.2. Socio-technical problems at local level
The study revealed two main problems that affect the rice value
chain in all the three areas: (1) local rice production remains low,
and (2) the current level of rice production provides little income
for farmers. Fig. 2 shows the aggregated problem tree constructed
from the problem analyses made in the focus group discussions.
3.2.1. Low rice production
The theoretical rice production capacity of the command area
for the three irrigation schemes recently has been estimated at 640
metric tons of paddy for Koussin-Lélé, 150 metric tons for Bamè and
400 metric tons for Zonmon [22]. The actual rice output remains
far below the estimated potential. The rice output recorded by the
extension ofﬁcers in 2010 indicated that 55% of the potential was
obtained at Koussin-Lélé, 14% at Bamè and only 3% at Zonmon. This
estimate of the gap between current production and what is attain-
able in each area can be explained by the lack of water for irrigation
during the dry season, which is caused by the poor maintenance of
the canals.
About three quarters of the rice farmers in the valleys (except
those who  are close to the water heads in the irrigation scheme)
experience a lack of water that negatively affects rice production
during the dry season. The ﬁeld visits revealed that the irrigation
canals are ﬁlled with sediment deposited by the ﬂoods during the
rainy season. Because of the topography of the three areas, the
valleys are inundated from July to October, and clay and silt are
deposited by the ﬂood waters. The sediment reduces the velocity
of the water ﬂow because it decreases the discharge capacity of
the canals. Aquatic plants then root in the silt and further decrease
the velocity of water ﬂow, increase water loss deeper into the soil
proﬁle and reduce the total amount of water available for irrigation.
The sediment and plants could be removed from the canals
by manual cleaning, to keep the water ﬂowing up to the ﬁelds
upstream under the gravity system. In all the three areas the
water gates that control the water ﬂow from the main canal to
the secondary canals are broken because of lack of maintenance
and because these gates are very old (constructed in the years
following 1976–1978). This also contributes to substantial water
losses. For instance, 8 of the 11 farmer members of Group 3 at
Koussin-Lélé reported that they lose almost 30–40% of their harvest
because of lack of irrigation water caused by poor canal mainte-
nance. Moreover, because the fees that are collected from farmers
after each harvest are mainly used for machinery and not for restor-
ing these water gates, farmers – individually or collectively – lack
the ﬁnancial resources to take care of the irrigation infrastructure.
It is for these reasons that, overall, the farmers interviewed dur-
ing the focus group discussions ranked the difﬁculties of accessing
water for irrigation and the lack of maintenance of the irrigation
infrastructure as the most important issues. Some, however, stated
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Fig. 2. Problem tree: the three
Table  4
Average revenue per farmer (in FCFA) for one harvest of paddy per hectare (2009
data).
Koussin-Lélé Bamè Zonmon
Production cost (per kg) 155 162 168
Selling price (per kg) 175 173 175
Margin (per kg) 20 11 7
Average amount sold per farmer (kg of paddy) 3500 1900 2000
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ource: questionnaire survey.
hat the restoration of the water gates and the broken lining of
he irrigation canals should be the responsibility of the irrigation
epartment, whereas others stated that they would take responsi-
ility but lacked the ﬁnancial resources to do so themselves.
Currently, upland plots that are not part of the gravity system,
re used only in Bamè where 10 rice farmers irrigate their plots
f about 1 ha each with water pumped out of the stream, using
heir small individually owned pumps. In the past, although more
han 65 ha at Koussin-Lélé, 55 ha at Zonmon and 18 ha at Bamè
ere irrigated in the valleys by the large pumps installed by the
hinese experts between 1972 and 1973, once these large pumps
roke down because of lack of regular maintenance, the rice farmers
o longer produce on these lands. Many farmers mentioned this
ituation as a serious problem that prevents them from extending
heir rice producing area.
.2.2. Low income from local rice production
Almost 9 out of 10 rice growers (farmers as well as farmer lead-
rs) stated that rice production does not provide them a decent
ncome. For the farmers in Koussin-Lélé this is a serious problem
ecause they are mainly dependent on rice production. In Bamè and
onmon, farmers have additional income activities but still suffer
rom low incomes, as the following illustrates: I realized that the
ncome that we get from the rice production is just enough to survive.
ince I was producing here, I did not build another house, I just suc-
eeded to buy a motorbike. [. . .]  If we could ﬁnd support to effectively
ddress our problems of production, credits, inputs and especially mar-
eting facilities, we can earn more by producing rice (A.H., Bamè,
7/08/2010).
In order to validate how little farmers earn from local rice
roduction we have estimated the total average return that each
armer gets from growing rice (Table 4) and have compared this
ith the ofﬁcial minimum wage. For this purpose, we estimated
he production costs and selling prices by building on the responses study areas combined.
to the questionnaire survey of 60 rice farmers in the three areas.
We  calculated the production costs (C) listed by these farmers by
taking into account the costs per kilogram of paddy (C1) for the
inputs directly used in the production system (seeds, fertilizers,
labour, etc.). We  included the interest rate (I1) for informal credit
in terms of kilograms of paddy. For instance, when a farmer receives
6000 FCFA from the trader, and pays back in kind a bag of 50 kg of
white rice (equivalent to 70 kg of paddy), the value of the paddy is at
least 12,500 FCFA. In this case, the informal credit cost (I1) is almost
92 FCFA per kilogram of paddy ((12,500–6000) per 70 kg). In addi-
tion, we calculated the interest (I2) that farmers pay to the banks
for formal credit. The total production cost (C) = (C1) + (I1) + (I2).
We then considered the equivalent of the paddy that corre-
sponds to the milled rice that is sold in order to derive the total
return per farmer. In the case where farmers sell both paddy and
milled rice, the milled rice was converted into paddy rice using a
conversion factor milled rice/paddy of 0.70.
Table 4 shows that, in our example, at Koussin-Lélé, farmers
made a total return of 70,000 FCFA per hectare and per rice harvest
season and a margin of 20 FCFA per kg of paddy. At Bamè, they
obtained a total return of 20,900 FCFA and a margin of 11 FCFA per
kg of paddy. Farmers from Zonmon obtained a total return of 14,000
FCFA and a margin of 7 FCFA per kg of paddy.
A rice production season covers four months so in that period
farmers earn the returns presented in Table 4, assuming that farm-
ers cultivate 1 ha. However, as can be seen from Table 1, the average
holding in Bamè and Zonmon is less than 1 ha. Our calculations
show that the rice grower’s income is low in comparison to the ofﬁ-
cial minimum wage of 31,625 FCFA per month. In Koussin-Lélé, the
most successful rice growing area, where each farmer can obtain
three harvests per year, a farmer’s return is still only about 55%
of the current minimum wage level (70,000 FCFA against 126,500
FCFA). In Bamè the return per farmer is 16.5% of the minimum wage
and only 11% in Zonmon. Three main factors were mentioned by the
farmers as the cause of their low rice incomes: (1) the low quality
of the local rice because of poor processing technologies, (2) an
uncertain market, and (3), high dependency on informal credit.
The lack of modern processing technologies in the study areas
means that the local rice is not always well polished. It also con-
tains contaminants such as gravel and the grains do not have
a uniform shape. All these characteristics encourage consumers’
preference for imported rice. The lack of an organized market out-
let for local rice is also one of the main factors discouraging farmers
from investing in rice production. In all the three areas, the farm-
ers complained about the uncertain market for their production,
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Table 5
Institutional barriers to innovation in the local rice value chain. The column ‘Farmers and their interest groups’ contains barriers at local level. The other columns contain
barriers above the local level.
Failures Farmers and their
interest groups
Governmental bodies Traders and clients Input suppliers and
banks
Consumers
Knowledge
infrastructure
Physical infrastructure Old local processing
equipment
Hard institutions Lack of effective local
sharing and
maintenance rules
Unclear division of
maintenance
responsibilities
Solidarity system
credit only accessible
to experienced farmers
and groups
Urban consumers’
preference for
imported rice
Soft  institutions Water considered as an
open resource
Interaction Privileges of certain
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market outlet
hich means they are left to the mercy of local traders who  oper-
te without any formal control. The (experienced or anticipated)
ack of access to and insufﬁciency of formal credit facilities and the
ack of a stable market for their rice harvest urges almost 55% of the
ice farmers to turn to the informal credit system provided by local
enders. These farmers are highly dependent on informal credit so
hat their harvest – in effect – is under the control of the lenders.
.3. Institutional barriers
Why  are the above-mentioned problems so persistent and hard
o solve? Why  has an intervention like the PUASA project had
o little effect? Institutional barriers hindering innovation help to
xplain this persistence. We  distinguish institutional barriers that
rise in a context common to all three areas, from barriers that are
eﬁned by local institutions (Table 5).
.3.1. Institutional barriers originating above the local level
Before the 1990 reforms the irrigation department in charge
f irrigation infrastructure faced major constraints in fulﬁlling its
aintenance task (principally an insufﬁcient budget and lack of
aterials [23]). The reform allowed the public authorities to hand
ver the costly maintenance responsibility to water users but little
rovision was made to ensure that the maintenance costs would
e covered and that the task could be performed [22]. Over the
ast ﬁve years the rice farmer associations have been developing
n organizational structure, with a national board at the top, but
he implications of the reform measures for farmer organizations
re still unclear. A small number of our respondents (just under
wo out of ten) still perceive maintenance to be a task of the public
rrigation engineers. The following extract from a focus group dis-
ussion at Koussin-Lélé clearly illustrates farmers’ perceptions: The
aintenance of the irrigation infrastructure is the task of the irrigation
epartment. The authorities know that farmers do not have enough
nancial capacity to deal with this. The irrigation engineers can have
 subsidy or a public fund to do the job but since a while they leave
his task to us (GD1, Koussin-Lélé, 17/08/2010).
The Structural Adjustment Programme negotiated with the
nternational Monetary Fund forced the Beninese government to
pen the input supply sector (for fertilizers, insecticides, etc.) to
rivate companies [24]. This sector, formerly controlled solely by
ublic companies, is now led by private businesses seeking high
roﬁts [25]. Input distribution today is monopolized by a few pri-
ate companies and these give preference to cotton production
reas because cotton growers use a large amount of inputs and
he companies make more proﬁt by selling cotton pesticides and
ertilizers. Furthermore, since rice is not an ofﬁcial cash crop with aompetition from
mported rice
Main focus on cotton
production areas
guaranteed collection system, the input suppliers perceive the risks
in supplying the rice production sector much higher. Each year, rice
farmers have to search for production inputs themselves. Further-
more, a fertilizer that has been speciﬁcally adapted to the rice crop
and the soils of the inland valleys is not available.
Until 1985 the government prohibited rice imports but under
the economic reforms the private sector was  allowed to import
rice under license [26]. In 1990 the licensing scheme was abolished
and anyone was allowed to import rice at any time. The penetra-
tion of the domestic market by companies selling foreign rice at
a competitive price and uniform grain size and quality, catalysed
urban consumers’ preference for imported rice. This has affected
the local rice sector in the sense that local traders today face severe
competition from imported rice, and market relationships have
become unstable. Following the rice market liberalization, farm-
ers have to ﬁnd their own markets for their products. Moreover,
they are not able to negotiate a good price with traders because
the quantities they bring to the market remain small. Many NGOs
(e.g., Veco – a Belgian Association, and the local NGO Entreprises
Territoires et Développement) in partnership with the national rice
farmer association are working with local rice farmer associations
to ﬁnd more lucrative urban market outlets for the local rice. Many
problems remain, however, including the low quality and irregular
availability of local rice.
3.3.2. Institutional barriers at local level
The solidarity credit system is preferred by all farmers, because
of the much lower interest rates compared with informal credit
sources. The rules, however, neither support individual production,
nor newly established rice producing groups since these do not
have a credit history and the leaders do not have enough experience
with the members’ behaviour to trust them and to support their
credit requests.
Farmers and other groups share irrigation water for many pur-
poses, including bathing and washing. Access to water is not
regulated in the same way everywhere. At Bamè and Zonmon
access to irrigation water is free for the users all the year. How-
ever, at Koussin-Lélé rice farmers have set rules to regulate water
distribution from January to March, the period when water shar-
ing becomes critical. In spite of these rules, farmers in this area
employ fraudulent practices that hinder effective water sharing (as
described above). This might be related to the fact that the farmers
in Koussin-Lélé seem to be more dependent on rice production on
their inland plots than the farmers in the two other areas.
The local rules for restoring the canals are also not sufﬁciently
effective. Ever since farmer organizations have been given the
direct control of the irrigation infrastructures, insufﬁcient means
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ave been made available to cover the maintenance costs. The new
esponsibility has compelled farmers to contribute to the main-
enance of their infrastructure by paying fees after each harvest
ut these fees are still not enough to allow farmers to perform
he task. Moreover, the management and the use of these ﬁnan-
ial resources are not transparent. Many farmers complain that the
ees collected for the restoration of the infrastructure are not used
ell by the leaders, alleging in all three areas that the resources
re sometimes spent for other purposes (functioning of the farmer
ssociation, celebrations) instead of ﬁnancing the maintenance of
he canal infrastructures.
The members of the small communities producing rice know
ach other very well, and over the years they have strengthened
heir relationships. But there are large power differences between
he leaders and other farmers. The Dah (traditional chiefs and heads
f families), the Mèho (who have been producing rice for at least
0–15 years), and the leaders of farmer associations are privileged
nd they enjoy many privileges (such as ﬁrst use of equipment,
ore access to formal credit and the power to deﬁne whether other
roup members get access to credit or to land). They also avoid sanc-
ions. For instance, while farmers in Koussin-Lélé are supposed to
ollow the established rules for canal cleaning and water use during
he dry season, the privileged farmers manage to ignore the rules
ithout sanctions. The other farmers cannot intervene since they
re dependent on these leaders’ goodwill in relation to land alloca-
ion and group credit applications to the local banks. These power
ifferences, and the resulting unfair access to resources and use
ights, create frustration and lead to mistrust among the farmers.
As a result, the farmers continue to perceive water as an open
ccess resource, arguing that all farmers have the right to take as
uch as they need. A typical comment made by a participant in
he focus group discussions illustrates this point: I do not understand
hy we set a schedule for water distribution. Water is an open resource
nd everybody can take as much as needed. Anytime when I need to
rrigate my plots, I will always open my  gates, no matter what can
appen (GD2, Koussin-Lélé, 18/08/2010).
This perception discourages farmers from anticipating or taking
nitiatives to sustain water use. It also diminishes farmers’ aware-
ess of the actions undertaken by water users in the upstream areas
hat can affect water availability downstream. A few ﬁshermen,
or instance, have established ﬁshponds in the upper reaches of
he Koussingo-Lélégo River. If this activity expands it will affect
ater availability for rice farmers but there is no appreciation of
his inter-dependence in how the water resource is used.
. Discussion: innovation opportunitiesMany technological packages for rice introduced in Benin have
ardly been used. The large irrigation schemes developed at Domè,
itro, Zounguè, Yokon for improving local rice production are cur-
ently not being used for rice production. We  have shown that the
able 6
indows of opportunity in the rice value chain.
Opportunity Farmers and their
interest groups
Governmental bodies 
Knowledge infrastructure Better water
management
techniques
Physical infrastructure Available land in the
upland area
Hard institutions 
Soft  institutions 
Interaction Innovative
private–public
partnerships
Market  structure of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 57– 66
institutional dimension contributes to create space for change for
individual farmers and communities [31,32,33].  There are evidently
signiﬁcant gaps between technicians’ expectations (policy-makers,
researchers, extension workers, etc.) and farmers’ perspectives,
needs and opportunities.
Farmers in the study areas are aware that many intertwined
factors impede the functioning and development of the rice value
chain and the efﬁcient use of irrigation water. They are conscious
that suitable solutions can be found by a more integrated approach.
They have emphasized the importance of addressing the institu-
tional issues (both barriers and opportunities) [6] and are interested
in the options identiﬁed in this study. Currently, a number are being
tested in the framework of the Convergence of Sciences – Strength-
ening Innovation Systems programme. The data collected for this
diagnostic study will be used as the base line against which changes
in practices, local institutions and productivity and income brought
about by these institutional experiments will be analysed, in all
three areas, in a few years time.
In this section we focus on these options, principally on the
opportunities to increase the efﬁciency of water management, rice
production per hectare and per household, and farmers’ income in
relation to the rise of demand for rice and the afﬁnity of consumers
to local products with territorial product labels, new investment
policies based on private–public partnerships, the availability of
better water management practices, and the availability of land in
the upland areas (Table 6).
4.1. Rice demand and consumer afﬁnity to local products
Rice demand in Benin is increasing; it is consumed more fre-
quently and in an increasing number of households. National rice
demand was  estimated at 30,000 metric tons in 1960, and by 2008
had increased to 120,000 metric tons [22]. The fast increase in
demand could be an opportunity for the inland valley rice farm-
ers. Participants in one focus group discussion observed: We can
remember that a few years ago it was very hard for us to ﬁnd some-
body to whom we could sell the rice. Since two  years, it seems that
traders are always waiting for the paddy. We  sold all the rice almost
two weeks after the harvest. Something is changing somewhere (GD5,
Bamè, 27/09/2010).
A signiﬁcant number of consumers seem to have lost trust in
imported foods and prefer to buy local products [27]. Basically, they
fear that anonymous actors in the value chain, such as primary pro-
ducers in other countries, food processers or animal feed industries
are more concerned with earning money than with the health of
consumers [12]. Imported products do not guarantee chain trans-
parency. These perceptions could be an open door for local products
associated with a system of traceability along a value chain that uses
little chemical inputs, for instance. The challenge in this context
is the ability of producers to guarantee to consumers the desired
added value.
Traders and clients Input suppliers and
banks
Consumers
Territorial product label
Afﬁnity to local products
Increased rice demand
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.2. Territorial product labels
In Benin, territorial product labels have been developed for a
umber of products to promote the association between products
nd their region of origin. For instance, rice from Natitingou is pro-
oted under the Nati Rice label and groundnut oil from the Agonlin
lateau is sold in Benin under the label of Agonlin mi.  These two
roducts are well known throughout the country because of their
lear quality criteria and recognizability in the market. For instance,
isitors to the Agonlin Plateau area are willing to buy the local oil
Agonlin mi)  because they trust its quality and like its taste. Selling a
roduct under a territorial label of origin allows all those in the des-
gnated territory to enter the market while protecting the integrity
f their production system from the entry of outsiders, allow farm-
rs to add non-economic value to the product, and to establish a
arket niche for the product. The associated regions become vis-
ble as an active space for innovation, where the actors use their
esources to create additional values for their communities [28].
In the case of the Nati Rice, the local authorities are engaged
n promoting this label as a local product from their community
nd it helps rice farmers from this region to sell their rice in return
or a percentage of the advertising proﬁt. Moreover, the Natitingou
egion (from which Nati label is derived) is a centre for tourism
nd the local authorities use the touristic value to promote local
roducts and to increase the linkages between domestic and inter-
ational visitors and the local economy.
An added value from a local rice label could be developed in
ur study areas and thereby provide the rice farmers access to
ew markets and increased sales. In addition, a territorial rice label
ould open opportunities for other sectors of the local economy.
his potential is highlighted in the following statement of a town
ouncil ofﬁcer in Covè Municipality: If we can get the support of the
ublic authorities for our rice value chain, that can help us to promote
nother range of our local product like the groundnut cake, the ground-
ut oil, etc.  and the tourism sector as well. It can generate additional
esources for producers (Covè’s town council ofﬁcer, October 2010).
.3. Public–private partnerships
From 2006 onwards the public authorities have begun develop-
ng new investment policies based on an innovative private–public
ommunity partnership for collective investment. The partnership
llows farmers to obtain assistance in sectors where public actors
re not present [29]. Since 2008, through the private–public part-
ership scheme, private companies (e.g., Tunde SA, Entreprises de
ervices et Organinations de Producteurs (ESOP) that offers farm
roduct marketing facilities) have become involved in local rice
rocessing. The partnerships allow farmers to process easily their
arvest and make use of improved marketing facilities. These
rivate companies share the public interest in business-oriented
conomic development [29] that can close some of the gaps in the
ice value chain. We  heard from the rice farmers in Bamè that mid-
011 they began testing an innovative business arrangement in
o-operation with ESOP. The company contracts with rice farmer
roups to supply a ﬁxed amount of rice against a purchase guaran-
ee. The company provides the contracted farmers with the seed of
igh-yielding varieties, fertilizers, and bags for packing their har-
est. The ESOP leaders, the national association of rice farmers and
he extension ofﬁcers agree in advance of each season the price the
ompany will pay the farmers for the contracted volume of paddy.
.4. Better water management techniquesInland valleys have speciﬁc characteristics that offer high poten-
ial for rice production. With proper water management practices,
ice yields per hectare could be improved considerably. Rice canof Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 57– 66 65
easily yield 30–50% more on the fertile inland valley soils than on
the upland soils [30].
The main advantage of improved maintenance of the irriga-
tion system is expected to be that water levels on the rice ﬁelds
can be controlled more accurately and that the water reaches the
upstream ﬁelds under the gravity system. In addition, the available
groundwater could be pumped into the rice plots that receive lit-
tle water during the dry seasons. The rice farmers at Malanville in
the northern region of Benin showed the possibilities of digging
shallow tube wells directly in each plot from which they pump
the ground water onto their ﬁelds. The shallow tube wells option
could also be used in the southern areas. If they are combined with
the new technology using small solar pumps they would offer a
sustainable alternative for the fuel needed by the regular motor-
pumps. Such wells could also help to use the available water more
efﬁciently.
4.5. Available land in the upland areas
At Bamè, the 19 rice farmers use only 4.5 ha, which means that
each farmer has on average less than 0.24 ha At the same time,
they have access to more than 58 ha in the upland area where each
rice farmer has the possibility to extend his production. Since in the
uplands the topography does not allow gravity irrigation, 40% of the
rice farmers have installed small motorpumps to draw water from
the Assanto stream into their plots. Pump irrigation allows farmers
to produce rice all year round. Three rice farmers already harvest
two times per year in the upland area and it is technically possible
for them to harvest three times per year in this area if they were to
adopt practices like mulching (as one of the farmers already does).
The mulch covers the exposed soil surface at the early growth stage
and conserves soil moisture. At the later growth stages the mulch
might enrich soil fertility. This practice has potential in the upland
area to increase rice yield and reduce the demand for water.
At Koussin-Lélé, rice farmers have access to 200 ha in addition
to the land they currently use but they do not use this area because
it has no functioning irrigation facilities. In Zonmon, 55 ha are lying
idle because the pump broke and has not been repaired. There is
clearly a potential for farmers in all the three areas to extend their
production on the upland plots and to earn more by producing more
rice.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we  set out to explore the factors that hinder the
development of the local rice value chain and the effective use of
water, and to identify promising opportunities for innovation. The
diagnostic study revealed a number of signiﬁcant institutional fac-
tors that hold production and incomes below their potential and
act as barriers to innovation.
At the local level we have shown that there are no effective rules
for water sharing and for maintaining the irrigation infrastructure.
The lack of canal maintenance negatively affects the use of water
(and hence output and incomes) in the inland valleys. Although
farmers are organized in groups, they seem to face dilemmas of
collective action related to existing power relations. The diagnostic
study revealed that the privileges enjoyed by the farmer leaders
induce frustration and maintain an unequal access to resources.
These institutional barriers restrain farmers’ ability or willingness
to develop or effectively make use of a range of options to improve
local production and living conditions. The public actors in the agri-
cultural sector in Benin have relied on technical change to boost
rice production, principally by introducing high-yielding varieties
and irrigation technologies. This strategy did not integrate the
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nstitutional dimensions of change and thus have met  with limited
uccess.
At higher institutional levels we showed that the market liber-
lization policy has created a signiﬁcant new barrier in so far as it
pened the door to strong competition from imported rice. Since
he inland valley farmers currently lack an alternative market out-
et their dependence on local traders has increased as competition
or market share has increased. We  further showed that although
wo thirds of the farmers receive formal credit from local banks
gainst a reasonable interest rate most are dependent also on high
nterest credit from local traders (up to 150%), leading to signiﬁcant
ndebtedness and a weaker market position.
Our main conclusions are that although options exist for sig-
iﬁcant innovation in the current situation there is a risk that local
roduction will remain low and that the national objective of boost-
ng local rice production to meet domestic demand seems way out
f reach unless local institutional issues are addressed.
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